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TRANSFORMING INITIAL ENTRY TRAINING TO SUPPORT A NATION AT WAR
In no other profession are the penalties for employing untrained personnel so appalling or so irrevocable as in the military -General MacArthur (1933) Overview "Transforming our nation's military capabilities while at war requires a careful balance between sustaining and enhancing the capabilities of current forces to fight wars and win the peace while investing in the capabilities of future forces." 1 As such, transforming Initial Entry
Training while fully engaged in two simultaneous conflicts and while converting the Army to a modular force required not only a deliberate and well-conceived plan, but an implementation strategy that would have minimum impact on the strategic flow of Soldiers to Combatant
Commanders. More importantly, integrating new strategic initiatives into the training base, while at war, could easily create an imbalance between available forces and Soldiers being maintained in a Transient, Trainee, Holding, and Student (TTHS) status.
As military efforts in Iraq moved into phase IV operations, the United States political and military leadership quickly realized that we had stumbled into a type of unconventional, asymmetric warfare (roadside bombing, suicide bombing, urban operations, etc.) that clearly had not been anticipated. The reality of young American Soldiers being killed on a daily basis was being broadcast into every American living room nightly and quickly bought into question the level of Soldier preparedness. The strategic and political implications of developing effective tactics, techniques, and procedures to counter this asymmetric threat would prove to be pivotal to the well being and the credibility of the force. As the enemy continued to adapt his fighting techniques, the United States had to adapt to and develop counter measures to his technical and tactical changes in near real time. Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to counter the enemy's demonstrated capabilities in both Iraq and Afghanistan, would soon find their way into in-theater and pre-deployment training for units and individual augmentees. The critical step was to embed these TTPs in CONUS based training practices not only to reduce the training burden on the war fighter in theater but begin the process of preparing Soldiers to face the asymmetric challenges of 21 st century warfare. As the Army senior leadership decided to incorporate these TTPs into Enlisted Initial Entry Training (IET), it utilized lessons learned from
Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom to establish the way ahead for future training.
The increasing number of the Soldiers deploying into combat zones within 30 to 60 days of completing Initial Entry Training provided the impetus to embed these training practices into the IET process as soon as possible.
Soldiers now progress through the five phases of IET with a higher level of proficiency in TTP inspired tasks than ever before. "Along the way, they discover a higher level of selfconfidence and an inner strength they will utilize from their first units of assignment and beyond." 2 There is a well-defined link between training objectives, exercise design, and performance assessment. "Event-based techniques and scenarios guide the design of tactical training opportunities by systematically introducing events within training exercises that provide known opportunities for Drill Sergeants to observe and give direct feedback through an after action review process." 3 As the Army's role expands, Initial Entry Training must stand ready with processes and products that support Combatant Commanders with well-trained, highly adaptable Soldiers for current and future battlefields. To do less than provide the most effective training to combat the asymmetric threat will negatively impact morale and lead to discrediting the force as a reliable instrument of national power.
This research paper will provide a historical perspective of IET, detailed analysis of the transformation process and implementation strategy as well as discuss the impact to the training base and Combatant Commanders. Last, it will discuss the work remaining to be done and the accomplishments of the transformation efforts in IET.
Posture of Initial Entry Training Prior to Change
The first and traditional model ( followed by a performance test at the conclusion of each phase as depicted in Figure 1 below.
These training practices bore little resemblance to the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) being applied on the asymmetric battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan. • Assess how the Army is conducting Initial Entry Training to meet the needs of the Commandant Commanders' efforts to combat asymmetric threats.
• Develop an adaptive strategy for the future training adjustments
• Determine executable training within projected resource constraints.
To address these objectives, the Task Force took a systemic but iterative approach to this massive undertaking. The composition of the Task Force was absolutely critical to the process.
The Task Force included a full spectrum of senior leadership subject matter experts from the operational, institutional (IET), and installation management communities.
As a precursor to developing viable options, the Task In the Department of Defense Transformation Planning Guidance, Secretary Rumsfeld stated, "We must transform not only the capabilities at our disposal, but the way we think, the way we train, the way we exercise, and the way we fight. Historically, recruits with General Educational Development (GED) certifications and women dropped out at a higher rate than men and those with a high school diploma.
Other Options
Other options considered were the increases in the course length of Basic Combat 
Basic Combat Training and One Station Unit Training
The second phase of implementation provided changes in ammunition authorizations for M2 and MK-19 familiarization firing in BCT and OSUT as a reduction in ammunition for the M2 from 50 rounds to 36 rounds and MK-19 will be reduced from 18 rounds to 10 rounds as outlined in FM 3-22.27 and FM 3-22.65. This reduction reflected the total rounds for both day and night fire.
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AIT Training
The second phase of implementation included changes in rifle marksmanship and Convoy Live Fire requirements.
1. AIT courses 23 weeks and greater will continue to re-qualify with individually assigned weapons. Soldiers attending AIT courses lasting less than 23 weeks are no longer required to re-qualify.
2. All AITs will conduct ARM training using the EST 2000 or live-fire, at the Commandant's discretion, regardless of course length. The EST 2000 would be used to Engage targets with M240B, M249, M2, MK-19.
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The incorporation of the Warrior Tasks and Battle Drills (WTBD) along with the other approved changes reshaped the training construct within the BCT. As reflected in Figure 5 number of E-7/6 Drill Sergeants, and approving use of Sergeants (E5) to serve as Drill Sergeants. It was a combination of the three that initially afforded TRADOC the flexibility to meet the training requirement while simultaneously enhancing the leader-to-led ratios.
Warrior Tasks More importantly, the successful documentation of these current training practices ensures consistency in tasks, condition and standards across the Army. The result is a more effective Soldier and thus a more effective force.
Recommendations
"Transforming is about more than developing new strategies and structures, it is about changing culture, about encouraging new ways of thinking so that we can develop new ways of fighting and provide our armed forces the tools they need to defend our way of life," 22 said
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. The path to this cultural change will take the services through a transformation Department of Defense training.
The reader can clearly see that the burden of affecting these changes made consideration of the following recommendations impossible. As the current training mechanisms achieve stability, the next logical step will be to move to the next level. To that end these recommendations are offered for consideration.
As TRADOC progresses towards more adaptive and relevant training practices in Initial Entry Training, it should strongly consider the establishment of Joint Basic Training vignettes. If we are truly to train the way we fight, joint and interoperable basic combat training is a construct that should be explored. The ability to link geographically separated training venues such as service ranges; training areas and facilities would add an effective training dimension at the entry Soldier level. We must embrace the concept of Network Centric Training (NCT) in IET.
Transformation is not simply focused on technological solutions, but rather on how these solutions affect individual and collective training in our joint forces. NCT is about enhancing combat power through shared awareness and training. At the center of network centric operations, is written doctrine that maintains pace with it. TRADOC must continue the periodicannual review of the Warrior Tasks and Battle Drills and other training practices to ensure it delivers the must effective and well prepared Soldier to the future. Additionally, in an effort to keep the training base relevant and ready, the Army's senior leadership must ensure OEF, OIF
